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Labor Studies Journal
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Corporate Employee Representation, Union Strategies, and Third-Party Union-Linked Monitoring

Germany’s BASF in Brazil as a Critical Case Study

João Paulo Cândia Veiga

Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil

Scott B. Martin

Columbia University and The New School, New York

This article examines an unusual experiment in Brazil with an employee "social dialogue" process established at the BASF chemical company, following the broad outlines of European works councils (EWCs) created in the 1990s under European Union requirements for large companies operating in that region. The new representation-cum-consultation scheme was created under a global push by BASF’s German headquarters to emulate EWCs in its various regional operations overseas, though also in response to union pressures. Once the structure was in place, management attempted, with at least partial success, to carry out a pre-emptive strategy of "venue-shifting." Nonetheless, unions avoided institutionalized co-optation or management "divide and rule" and expanded the agenda of consultation and negotiation beyond their traditional scope. Third-party union-linked monitoring—quite distinct from typical "independent monitoring"—helped raise the salience and legitimacy of various union and worker grievances.

Key Words: monitoring • corporate social responsibility • labor standards • transnational corporations • unions

This version was published on September 1, 2009

Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 34, No. 3, 363-384 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0160449X08319701


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